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Executive Summary 
Emerging-market multinational enterprises (EMNEs) have become major players in the global 
economy, with an increasing share of global Foreign direct investment (FDI). Indigenous Mobile 
network operators (MNOs) in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are not left out in this pursuit, as they 
seek growth and competitiveness beyond their domestic markets. We investigate the FDI location 
choices and competitive interactions of the five indigenous SSA MNOs that had internationalized 
as of 2014 and find that, contrary to the literature, these EMNEs, operating in a key and rapidly-
developing industry, did not tend to commence their cross-border expansion in geographically-
close markets. In addition, the MNOs are more likely to invest in countries with stronger control 
over corruption, and do not appear to engage in heavy head-to-head competition with their rivals. 
These findings contribute to the internationalization literature in the context of the investment and 
competitive behaviors of the currently-underexplored indigenous SSA multinationals. 
Key Words: Sub-Saharan Africa, Competitive interactions, Emerging market multinational 
enterprises, Mobile network operators, FDI 
Introduction 
Spurred by the quest for gaining access to markets and natural resources, along with enhanced 
operational efficiency and competitiveness, Emerging-market multinational enterprises (EMNEs), 
including those from developing and transition economies, have become major players in the 
global economy. EMNEs are said to have accounted for an increasing share of global Foreign 
direct investment (FDI) (Kedia, Rhew, Gaffney, & Clampit, 2015; McAllister, & Sauvant, 2013; 
UNCTAD, 2014). The stock of Outward FDI (OFDI) by EMNEs grew rapidly, from less than 5% 
(US $11.9 billion) in 1990 to 29% (US $328 billion) in 2010 (UNCTAD, 2011). In addition, the 
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contribution of EMNEs to global OFDI was estimated to be on the order of 36% (US $486 billion) 
in 2014 (UNCTAD, 2015; Thirlwell, 2015). 
With this strong influence on the global economy, EMNEs now constitute an important 
global phenomenon, attracting the attention of both academics and practitioners who seek to gain 
more understanding about the foreign-market investment behaviors of this category of firms, 
especially with respect to how they expand operations into, and compete in, foreign markets. Thus, 
the combined issues of cross-border expansion and competition have been the subjects of ongoing 
debate in the academic literature, as scholars employ a variety of theoretical perspectives to 
investigate the foreign market investment and competitive behaviors of Multinational enterprises 
(MNEs), including those in both the manufacturing and service sectors. 
Still, our understanding to date has been based predominantly on the experiences of MNEs 
from developed markets (Chittoor, 2009; Guillén & Garcia-Canal, 2009; Madhok & Keyhani, 
2012). Based on the argument that the international trajectories of EMNEs may differ from those 
of their developed-country counterparts (Mathews, 2006; Luo & Tung, 2007; Rugman, 2009; Gaur 
& Kumar, 2010; Narula, 2012; Ramamurti, 2012; Aharoni, 2014), there have been calls for 
EMNE-specific cross-border expansion studies (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012). 
Given the wide market and institutional discrepancies between developed- and emerging-
market regions (Ghemawat, 2007; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 
1997), findings based on studies embedded in developed-market contexts are expected to offer 
incomplete insights into the behaviors of firms in emerging-markets. Thus, making conjectures 
about EMNEs based on such studies may be very misleading. For example, the fact that EMNEs 
necessarily develop capabilities related to operating in challenging institutional and home market 
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environments means that we need to be taking a more nuanced and context-specific view of their 
internationalization strategies (Arnold & Quelch, 1998; Khanna, Palepu, & Sinha, 2005; London 
& Hart, 2004; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009).  
While there has been a growing body of literature on the internationalization of EMNEs 
(Eren-(UGRJPXV&REDQRJOX<DOFÕQ	*KDXUL*DXU.XPDU	6LQJK<LX/DX	
Bruton, 2007), the telecommunications industry remains underexplored, as much of the extant 
work has focused on developed-market-based participants (e.g., Clegg & Kamall, 1998; Clifton, 
Comín, & Díaz-Fuentes, 2011; Curwen & Whalley, 2006; Fernández & Usero, 2007; Gerpott & 
Jakopin, 2005; Jakopin & Klein, 2012; Pogrebnyakov, 2007; Sarkar, Cavusgil, & Aulakh, 1999; 
Whalley & Curwen, 2006). Our search of the literature revealed only two studies, that have focused 
on the cross-border expansion of emerging-market Mobile network operators (MNOs1); Alkaabi, 
Demirbag, DQG7DWRJOXGLGVRIURPWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRI4WHO¶V4DWDU7HOHFRPH[SDQGLQJ
beyond its domestic market, Qatar, while Lisitsyn, Sutyrin, Trofimenko, and Vorobieva (2005) 
ZDVEDVHGRQ5XVVLDQ012V¶H[SDQVLRQLQWRWKH&RPPRQZHDOWKRI,QGHSHQGHQW6WDWHV 
Two key gaps are evident. First, the context of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA2) has not been 
addressed. Second, the international expansion of emerging-market MNOs has been explored 
solely with regard to the focal firms themselves, without consideration of the competition from 
rivals also operating in foreign markets. SSA is WKHZRUOG¶VVHFRQGIDVWHVW-growth economic region 
(World Bank, 2014; IMF, 2014), after the Asia Pacific region, as well as home to WKHZRUOG¶VPRVW
rapidly-expanding mobile telecom industry (GSMA, 2017). The intensification of MNO activities 
                                                          
1
 An MNO is a telecommunications firm that owns and controls both radio spectrum licenses and the network 
infrastructure capable of delivering wireless voice and data communications to subscribed users. 
2
 SSA comprises a total of 49 African countries, including the 43 mainland countries lying below the Sahara Desert 
and six island countries in both the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. 
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in this region makes it important to develop an understanding of how SSA-based MNOs have 
expanded across borders and competed in an environment characterized by notably rapid uptake 
of mobile telecom services. 
In much of the SSA region, mobile service has effectively leapfrogged the chronically-
inadequate land-line telephony. Mobile telephones are thus used for much more than calls and text 
messages. In addition to Internet browsing and social networking, mobile banking (mobile money) 
is important and growing rapidly (Shadbolt, 2015; The Economist, 2016; VOA News, 2015). 
GSMA (2016) reports that 55% of the 271-global live mobile money services are found in the SSA 
region, which also accounts for more than 63% of the active global mobile money accounts 
worldwide; GSMA (2017) reports that 140 live mobile money services were operational in 39 SSA 
countries at the end of 2016. ThXVZKLOH66$¶VPRELOHVXEVFULEHUSHQHWUDWLRQUDWHVWLOOODJVWKH
JOREDODYHUDJHYVSHU*60$WKHUHJLRQ¶VKXJHSRSXODWLRQ± approximately 
one billion ± provides strong opportunities for MNOs and incentives for the firms to expand their 
operations through FDI.  
Given its remarkable diversity in terms of market size, culture (including language), level 
of economic and infrastructural development, political stability, and historical orientation, SSA is 
an extremely interesting context in which to explore cross-border expansion and competitive 
interactions. In this study, we aim to shed light on how MNOs originating from SSA have 
expanded across national borders and competed in their home regional market. There were five 
such SSA-based MNOs with substantial cross-border activities as of 2014; we investigate the 
patterns of their international expansion and competitive interactions. Our study is guided by the 
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UHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQ³+RZGRWKHLQGLJHQRXV012VIURP6XE-Saharan Africa internationalize and 
FRPSHWHZLWKHDFKRWKHU"´ 
By addressing this two-part research question, we extend the literature on the 
internationalization and competitive interactions of EMNEs in the mobile telecom industrial 
subsector. Building upon theoretical frameworks pertaining to internationalization, and especially 
multimarket competition, we investigate how MNOs indigenous to SSA have expanded across 
national borders and competed with rivals within the region, from the inception of the mobile 
telecom industry in the late l980s. In the process, we aim to add to the body of knowledge 
pertaining to cross-border expansion and competitive interactions of MNEs from the 
underexplored SSA context (Zoogah, 2008; Acquah, Zoogah, & Kwesiga, 2013; George, 2015; 
Amankwah-Amoah, 2016; George, Corbishley, Khayesi, Haas, & Tihanyi 2016).   
7KH PRELOH WHOHFRP LQGXVWU\ KDV VRPH TXLWH VSHFLILF FKDUDFWHULVWLFV WKDW DIIHFW ILUPV¶
expansion and competitive behaviors. This is a strictly-regulated industry with high entry barriers 
(%RXUUHDX	'R÷an, 2001; Clifton et al., 2011; Nicolaides, 1994; Sarkar et al., 1999), offering 
services that are very technology-oriented (Ferreira Ribeiro, Oliveira De Miranda Jr., Borini, & 
Bernardes, 2014; Johansson, 1994; Kim, Lee, & Kim, 2009). The number of MNOs operating in 
most countries is quite low, creating a highly-concentrated environment (Gruber, 2001; Gruber & 
Verboven, 2001). The mobile telecom industry is also viewed as highly strategic, in terms of 
national security and economic growth (OECD, 1991; Teece, 1991), which leads to the high 
likelihood of government involvement in the activities of MNOs.  
Thus, our study contributes to both academic theory and managerial practice. Highlighting 
how indigenous MNOs have expanded and competed across SSA adds to the emerging-market 
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literature. Exploring the cross-border expansion and competition of these emerging-market MNOs 
operating in their dynamic and diverse home region allows us to contribute to both the international 
business and strategy literatures. Our findings reveal some clear distinctions, relative to 
conjectures based on the extant literature pertaining to internationalization and international 
competition. From the perspective of practice, we create a knowledge base to support the learning 
of indigenous MNO managers (both incumbent and prospective), for creating or enhancing own 
strategies pertaining to cross-border expansion and competitive interaction.  
Theoretical Background 
Given that international expansion offers potential for economies of scale and enhanced 
competitive advantages (Ghemawat, 2007; Penrose, 1995; Porter, 1986; Sapienza, Autio, George, 
& Zahra, 2006), firms are incentivized to expand operations beyond their domestic markets. 
Operating in foreign markets is, however, risky (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2001; Johanson & 
Vahlne, 2009; Bouncken, Cesinger, & Kraus, 2014), and may have a negative influence on 
performance (Lawton & Harrington, 2006; Kumar & Singh, 2008); hence, internationalization has 
serious implications for managers, who are concerned with the choice of markets in which to invest 
and the most cost-effective entry strategies to adopt (Kraus, Ambos, Eggers, & Cesinger, 2015). 
Henten (2001) and Einhorn (2002) indicate that the commercial cross-border supply of 
telecom services had been in existence since the inception of telecom as an element of the offers 
of fixed-OLQHSURYLGHUV+RZHYHU-RKDQVVRQFRQWHQGV WKDW³UHDO´ LQWHUQDWLRQDOL]DWLRQRI
wireline telecom operators did not occur until the 1980s, when telecom carriers began to buy equity 
shares in foreign operators and to create new ventures abroad, following the privatization of state-
owned incumbents and the opening up of fixed-line markets to competition. According to Serrano, 
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Bane, and Tunstall (1991), a record 300 telecom diversification ventures took place across 60 
countries in 1986-1991. Gerpott and Jakopin (2005) note that cross-border expansion of telecom 
gained an additional boost in the early 1990s, following the introduction of cellular or mobile 
communication (Stuber, 2011) and the granting of GSM (Global System for Mobile 
Communication) licenses to both local and foreign operators to compete with state-owned 
incumbents (Clegg & Kamall, 1998; Whalley & Curwen, 2005; Gerpott & Jakopin, 2008; Sarkar 
et al., 1999; Stienstra, Baaij, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2004). 
The literature identifies several factors as having driven internationalization among MNOs. 
In addition to previous international experience of the firm, business-friendly host-country 
regulatory and market environments (Kim et al., 2009; Clifton et al., 2011), which served to 
heighten competitive pressures in domestic markets (often due to diminishing growth potential), 
increasing subscriber acquisition costs, and shrinking average revenue per user (Graack, 1996) 
(Pogrebnyakov, 2007; Eggers, Grajek, & Kretschmer, 2012) rank among the major drivers.  
Internationalization in the mobile telecom industry was also the outcome of other forces; 
including the quest to establish an international presence and consolidate subscriber bases for 
revenue growth (Clegg & Kamall, 1998; Kim et al., 2009). The desires to leverage knowledge and 
expertise ± or ownership advantage ± acquired through domestic operations (Gerpott & Jakopin, 
2005), exploit early-mover advantages (Sarkar et al., 1999; Bijwaard, Janssen, & Maasland, 2008; 
Jakopin & Klein, 2012), and achieve prompt return on investment (Ahmad, 2014) were additional 
PRWLYDWRUV7KHLQWHUQDWLRQDOL]DWLRQRIPRELOHWHOHFRPZDVIXUWKHUSURPSWHGE\012V¶TXHVWVIRU
gaining economies of scale and scope (Stienstra et al., 2004) and acquiring new knowledge (Clegg 
& Kamall, 1998). 
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Whereas MNOs have strong incentives to embark on foreign-market operations, it is 
important to note that they also face barriers that create boundary conditions for 
internationalization. Given the nature of telecommunications, especially with respect to national 
security and economic development (OECD, 1991; Teece, 1991), the industry is very important to 
governments. Thus, the entry of new MNOs into any country is strictly regulated (e.g., Bouckaert, 
Van Dijk, & Verboven, 2010; Grajek & Röller, 2012), and governments tend to limit the number 
of operating licenses that can be issued to new entrants. Bolstering this view, our preliminary study 
reveals that there were, on average, 3.5 MNOs (including both multinational and single-market 
firms) per SSA country as of 2014. Of the 49 countries in the region, six, including Comoros, 
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Swaziland, still operated monopoly mobile 
telecom markets as of 2014, suggesting that cross-border expansion of MNOs into these countries 
was either not possible or subject to barriers that were prohibitive. 
There is considerable variation in the approaches that MNOs have adopted in their 
internationalization. Al-Kaabi, Demirbag, and Tatoglu (2010) find that some MNOs 
internationalized in stages, in a manner consistent with the Uppsala model (Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977). There is also evidence that many MNOs have been more regionally-focused in their foreign 
investment (e.g., Whalley & Curwen, 2005; Pogrebnyakov, 2008), consistent with Rugman and 
Verbeke (2004), investing first in their home regions before venturing afield. Yet, Pogrebnyakov 
and Maitland (2011) contend that many of the mobile telecom firms have crossed borders more 
rapidly, in contrast to the stepwise approach described in the Uppsala model. For instance, Sarkar 
et al. (1999) note that MNOs have tended to internationalize at different paces. Gerpott and Jakopin 
(2DUJXHWKDW WKHILWEHWZHHQDQ012¶VLGLRV\QFUDWLFPDUNHWHQYLURQPHQWDQGLWVUHVRXUFH
EDVH GHWHUPLQHV WKH ILUP¶V ZLOOLQJQHVV WR LQWHUQDWLRQDOL]H KHQFH WKH GHJUHH DQG SDWWHUQ RI
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internationalization among MNOs vary with time. Some former national incumbent operators, 
including Telefonica, crossed borders much more vigorously than others, such as British Telecom 
(Clifton et al., 2011). 
As Clegg and Kamall (1998) point out, countries with locational advantages, such as large 
population and strong economies, are generally favored for FDI in the mobile telecom sector. Cave 
DQG 9RJHOVDQJ  REVHUYH WKDW DQ 012¶V FKRLFHV UHJDUGLQJ PDUNHWV DQG HQWU\ VWUDWHJLes 
GHSHQGKHDYLO\RQWKHSRWHQWLDOKRVWFRXQWU\¶VLQYHVWPHQWLQLQIUDVWUXFWXUHDQGWKHSUHYDLOLQJOHYHO
of access prices3. Higher access prices constitute an impediment to internationalization, as new 
entrants have to rely on established incumbents during the early phase of market entry (Cave & 
Volgelsang, 2003), which leads to a tendency for MNOs to enter new markets via Merger and 
acquisition (M&A), especially in markets with already-established mobile infrastructure (He, Lim, 
& Wong, 2006; Gerpott & Jakopin, 2008; Pogrebnyakov, 2008). Where mobile telecom 
infrastructure is lacking, market entry is more likely to be in the form of a greenfield wholly-owned 
or joint venture start-up, or investment in an existing MNO (Gerpott & Jakopin, 2005). Gerpott 
and Jakopin (2005) note that, while it is very challenging for start-ups to gain positive returns in 
the short run, equity share investments in existing MNOs make foreign market entry much faster 
and easier. 
The competitive dynamics theoretical perspective argues that a performance-enhancing 
action undertaken by a firm often triggers reactions from rivals, who may consider the move as a 
threat to their own success (MacMillan, McCaffery, & Van Wijk, 1985; Chen & MacMillan, 1992; 
                                                          
3
 Access prices are regulatory fees paid by a new entrant in order to have access to essential inputs provided by rivals 
in the host market. It is important to note that no single operator can provide all of the network facilities required to 
switch calls between all possible locations. 
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Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Smith, Ferrier, & Ndofor, 2001). Baum and Korn (1996) note that firms 
undertake both offensive and defensive competitive-advantage-generating actions vis-à-vis their 
rivals. One such competitive strategy is to follRZDULYDO¶VIRUHLJQPDUNHWLQYHVWPHQWVHQWHULQJ
and establishing FDI positions in the same markets (Knickerbocker, 1973; Flowers, 1976; Ito & 
Rose, 2002; Rose & Ito, 2008).  
This is especially pronounced among firms operating in an oligopolistic situation, such as 
that faced by many MNOs; the literature suggests that such firms have a tendency to match the 
international investments of their key rivals (Karnani & Wernerfelt, 1985; Yu & Ito, 1988; Head, 
Meyer, & Ries, 2002). Porter (1980) asserts that firms IHHOWKHHIIHFWVRIHDFKRWKHU¶VFRPSHWLWLYH
moves and are prone to counter them. In the presence of such follow-the-leader behavior, rival 
firms often find themselves facing each other simultaneously in a variety of different locations, 
creating multimarket competition (Karnani & Wernerfelt, 1985; Bulow, Geanakoplos, & 
Klemperer, 1985; Baum & Korn, 1996; Jayachandran, Gimeno, & Varadarajan, 1999). As 
oligopolistic firms have the ability ± and the incentive ± WREHFRQVFLRXVRIWKHLUULYDOV¶DFWLRQV
(GreveH[SORULQJVXFKILUPV¶PLPHWLFFRPSHWLWLYHDFWLRQVDQGUHDFWLRQVPD\RIIHUGHHSHU
insights for cross-border expansion. 
In the case of telecom, while Fernández and Usero (2009) contend that mobile operators 
have gained market share by adopting different competitive strategies, relative to their competitors, 
Gimeno et al. (2005) find evidence that U.S. telecom firms with large domestic market shares have 
JHQHUDOO\ WHQGHG WR PLPLF HDFK RWKHU¶V HQWU\ VWUDWHJLHV ZKHQ FURVVLQJ ERUGHUV. Other studies 
(Bouckaert et al., 2010; Grajek & Röller, 2012) suggest that competition in the mobile industry 
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depends on the regulations that make entry possible. Gauging the effect of competition on 
investment in telecom remains a challenge (Garrone & Zaccagnino, 2015).   
Thus, the picture regarding how mobile telecom companies internationalize and compete 
remains unclear. In addition, the literature pertaining to this industry has generally focused on the 
activities of firms based in developed countries. This means that there is a need to undertake studies 
of EMNEs in the mobile telecom industry, in order to create a more complete conceptualization of 
the foreign market behaviors of MNEs in this field. Against this backdrop, and building upon the 
existing theoretical understanding, our study explores the cross-border expansion and competitive 
behaviors of the MNOs that are indigenous to SSA. 
$V WKH ZRUOG¶V OHDVW PRELOH-penetrated region (GSMA, 2015), with strong projected 
economic growth (IMF, 2014; Deloitte, 2015), the investment situation faced by mobile telecom 
operators in SSA is very dynamic. While the market is dominated by foreign MNOs, there are also 
some very competitive indigenous (i.e., SSA-headquartered) firms that have expanded their 
operations to compete outside of their home-country markets. Given that cross-border expansion 
and competition affect the international strategy and performance of firms (Van Witteloostuijn, 
1993; Gimeno, 1999; Greve, 2008; Kumar & Singh, 2008), including MNOs (Gerpott & Jokopin, 
2005; Peppard & Rylander, 2006), we expect these indigenous MNOs to exhibit some context-
specific cross-border behaviors that are contingent upon being embedded in the SSA business 
environment. Consistent with the argument that the nature of competitive rivalries influences 
ILUPV¶LQYHVWPHQWGHFLVLRQVHJ*LPHQR, Hoskisson, Beal, & Wan, 2005), we posit that decisions 
DURXQGWKHFKRLFHRIPDUNHWVDVLQYHVWPHQWORFDWLRQVDUHDIIHFWHGE\ULYDOV¶FRPSHWLWLYHPRYHV
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Given that inter-firm competition is a continuous process, it is logical to assume that competitive 
ULYDOULHVLQIOXHQFHWKH012¶VGHFLVLRQVERWKSULRUWRDQGDIWHUHQWU\LQWRWKHIRFDOPDUNHW 
Multinational Indigenous Sub-Saharan Africa MNOs 
There were 16 MNOs with active multinational operations within the SSA regional market 
as of the time of this study. Of these, five were SSA-headquartered and thus considered to be 
indigenous; the non-indigenous MNOs included five with headquarters in developed markets and 
six with headquarters in emerging markets. In this study, we focus on the five indigenous SSA 
MNOs, whose internationalization profiles are summarized in Table 1.  
-----Insert Table 1 about here----- 
Theory Development and Hypotheses 
The notion that cross-border activity offers potential for generating economies of scale and 
enhancing firm performance (e.g., Porter, 1986; Sapienza et al., 2006; Ghemawat, 2007) provides 
an explanation for why many firms, including emerging-market MNOs, choose to operate in 
foreign markets, despite the obvious challenges that come with international diversification 
(Brouthers, 1995; Hennart, 2009). To mitigate these challenges, choices around markets for 
investment and entry strategies are central to the cross-border expansion process of the firm, with 
managers aiming to select markets that they believe are most likely to offer cost-effective entry 
strategies at the acceptable levels of risk, while rapidly generating the desired return on investment. 
As SSA countries are developing and emerging markets, with numerous institutional challenges, 
the investment decisions of MNOs in the region are particularly complicated. Like other emerging 
markets, SSA countries have context-specific issues that may challenge the cross-border expansion 
of the indigenous MNOs, beyond the understanding common in the extant literature. 
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Previous studies indicate that MNOs tend to have firm-specific international entry 
strategies in emerging markets, typically using M&As to enter countries that have well-established 
capabilities for mobile operations (e.g., He et al., 2006; Gerpott & Jakopin, 2008; Pogrebnyakov, 
+RZHYHUWKHIDFWRUVWKDWJXLGHWKHVHILUPV¶)',ORFDWLRQGHFLVLRQVUHPDLQXQFOHDU*LYHQ
that most of the SSA countries already had functional infrastructure for mobile, each being served 
by at least two established international and/or local MNOs since the early 2000s, potential entrants 
have reasonable M&A opportunities. Thus, MNOs considering international expansion in the 
region are likely to focus more on issues of market selection than on entry strategies; hence, we 
focus our study accordingly.  
The Uppsala model (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977), which is widely-employed to explain the 
process of internationalization (Vahlne & Nordström, 1993), suggests that firms tend to develop 
their international market expansion gradually, beginning with geographically proximate markets, 
or those perceived to be psychically close, in terms of aspects including culture, institutions, and 
location ± before entering more distant ones. Such markets are expected to be more easily 
understood by the investing firms, and to offer more familiar operating environments (O'Grady & 
Lane, 1996).  
Eriksson, Johanson, Majkgard, and Sharma (1997) note that firms build on the experiential 
knowledge accumulated in the earlier markets for their subsequent foreign market entries. Thus, a 
VWHSZLVHLQYHVWPHQWSDWWHUQLVSUHVXPHGWRRIIHU OHDUQLQJRSSRUWXQLWLHVWKDWHQKDQFHWKHILUP¶V
foreign market knowledge base, which, when developed, can help to guide entry into less familiar 
and/or more remote markets.  
Al-Kaabi et al. (2010) find evidence of staged approaches in the cross-border expansion of 
Qatar Telecom (QTel). Other studies (Clegg & Kamall, 1998; Whalley & Curwen, 2005; Curwen 
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& Whalley, 2006; Pogrebnyakov, 2008) have also suggested that many mobile operators exhibit 
regional tendencies in their international dispersion, entering closer-to-home regional (and 
subregional) markets before expanding farther afield; this is consistent with the Uppsala model, 
with respect to geographic and, to an extent, psychic distance. Given both the scale and diversity 
of the SSA region, we expect to observe similar behavior among the indigenous MNOs we are 
considering. Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1. Indigenous MNOs in SSA have a higher propensity to begin their cross-
border expansion in markets within their home subregions (i.e., Eastern, Central, 
Southern, and Western Africa). 
Beyond geographic distance, the literature has long viewed country-specific factors as 
important to decisions regarding potential FDI locations (e.g., Andersen, 1993; Dunning, 1998). 
In the case of Africa, Asiedu (2006) notes that large countries with strong economic growth, better 
standards of living, favorable government and regulatory policies, and sound market institutions 
tend to be more successful in attracting FDI. Within the mobile telecom industry, there is strong 
evidence that MNOs tend to prioritize more attractive countries in their international investment 
location choices (e.g., Pogrebnyakov, 2008; Luiz & Stephan, 2012). Al-Kaabi et al. (2010) 
observes that populous countries with sound economic growth and high standards of living tend 
to generate rapid return on investment in the mobile telecom business and, as such, represent 
favorable investment locations. 
There is little reason to expect that indigenous SSA MNOs will view things differently in 
this regard. We postulate, accordingly, that SSA country markets with favorable country-specific 
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factors such as large market size, high standards of living, and strong economic growth will be 
more attractive for investment among the indigenous telecom firms, and thus hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2A: Indigenous MNOs in SSA have a higher propensity to invest in countries 
with stronger economic growth. 
Hypothesis 2B: Indigenous MNOs in SSA have a higher propensity to invest in countries 
with higher standards of living.   
Hypothesis 2C: Indigenous MNOs in SSA have a higher propensity to invest in countries 
with larger populations. 
The literature also emphasizes the importance of the institutional environments of the home 
and host countries in FDI decisions. As defined by North (1990), institutions are essentially the 
formal (legal) or informal (customs and traditions) norms and practices that determine how things 
happen within a society. Chao and Kumar (2010) demonstrate that institutional distance, a measure 
RIVLPLODULW\EHWZHHQWKHKRPHDQGSRWHQWLDOKRVWFRXQWULHVLVUHODWHGWRILUPV¶FKRLFHVRI)',
locations. The general assumption is that FDI is less complicated, and more likely to be successful, 
when the institutional environments of the home and host countries are more similar to each other, 
as the investing firm should then have better familiarity with how business is to be done in the host 
country. It is reasonable to assume that institutional similarity will pay even stronger dividends 
when the entry is made using M&A, given the need to deal simultaneously with both the host 
institutional environment and the merging of two corporate cultures. 
In the developing- and emerging-market SSA context, the huge diversity of cultural norms, 
DORQJZLWKWKHUHJLRQ¶VFRORQLDOKLVWRU\PDNHVRPHLQVWLWXWLRQDOPHDVXUHVSDUWLFXODUO\SHUWLQHQW
HJ FRXQWULHV¶ RIILFLDO ODQJXDJHV WKH SUHVHQce of common colonial ties, and approaches to 
corruption. Shared colonial ties lead to similarities in legal systems, offering the potential to ease 
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WKHLQYHVWLQJILUP¶VQDYLJDWLRQRIWKHUHJXODWRU\HQYLURQPHQWLQWKHKRVWFRXQWU\UHGXFLQJSV\FKLF
distance. Corruption, a reality in much of the SSA region, is widely acknowledged to make doing 
business more difficult and less profitable. A common operating language also reduces the 
difficulty of doing business in a different environment, and hence the psychic distance; Bornadi 
(2004) and Pogrebnyakov (2008) find, for instance, that language plays an important role in the 
international expansion of MNOs. Hence, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3A: Indigenous MNOs in SSA have a higher propensity to invest in markets 
that share a common operating language with their home markets. 
Hypothesis 3B: Indigenous MNOs in SSA have a higher propensity to invest in markets 
that share colonial ties with their home markets. 
Hypothesis 3C: Indigenous MNOs in SSA have a higher propensity to invest in markets 
with stronger control over corruption. 
Literature pertaining to multimarket competition provides strong evidence that firms 
operating in an oligopolistic environment have tendency to behave in rather specific ways. While 
these five indigenous MNOs may not form a traditional, market share-defined oligopoly, it is 
UHDVRQDEOHWRDVVXPHWKDWWKH\SD\SDUWLFXODUDWWHQWLRQWRHDFKRWKHU¶VLQYHVWPHQWVWUDWHJLHVJLYHQ
the highly-competitive and dynamic environment in which they operate. Knickerbocker (1973) 
notes the tendency of oligopolistic firms to UHVSRQGWRULYDOV¶QHZ-market FDI by establishing their 
own subsidiaries in those same markets, generating a follow-the-leader pattern. This oligopolistic 
reaction strategy is consistent with the competitive dynamics argument that successful actions 
undertaken by a firm may trigger reactions from its rivals, who consider the actions as threatening 
to their competitive positions (MacMillan et al., 1985; Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Chen & 
Hambrick, 1995; Smith et al., 2001). Such behavior has been observed across a variety of 
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manufacturing and service industries in different international contexts (Yu & Ito, 1988; Ito & 
Rose, 2002; Rose & Ito, 2008), and is posited to be associated with drivers as diverse as uncertainty 
and risk aversion (Head et al., 2002) and learning (Altomonte & Pennings, 2008). 
)ROORZLQJDULYDO¶V)',PRYHVUHSUHVHQWVDYHU\FRPSHWLWLYHVWUDWHJ\DVLWPD\DOORZWKH
ILUPWREOXQWWKHULYDO¶VHDUO\-mover advantage; this should be especially important in a rapidly-
growing industry such as mobile telecom, particularly in an emerging-market region context. Chen 
DQG 0LOOHU  SRVLW WKDW FRPSHWLQJ ILUPV UHVSRQG WR ULYDOV¶ LQYHVWPHQW PRYHV LQ RUGHU WR
neutralize the effects of these moves and to signal their own readiness to fight back and engage in 
multimarket competition if further threatened. Similarly, Knickerbocker (1973) contends that 
ULYDOVUHDFWWRHDFKRWKHU¶VFRPSHWLWLYHPRYHVLQDQHIIRUWWRPDLQWDLQWKHSUHYDOHQWHTXLOLEULXPRI
competition, as well as to deter further actions. While most empirical findings in the international 
business literature have suggested the prevalence of such a bandwagon effect, it is also possible 
that some oligopolistic firms establish an explicit or implicit understanding and adopt an agreed-
upon strategy that aims at avoiding excessively-intense rivalries and enhancing their joint (and 
individual) profitability (Yu & Ito, 1988). Mutual avoidance may also occur in the absence of 
collusion, driven by different strategic imperatives (Rose & Ito, 2008). Accordingly, both follow-
the-leader and mutual avoidance are justifiable competitive strategies among firms in an 
oligopolistic industry. However, there is still much to learn about the motivations behind the use 
of these strategies or the post-entry dynamics of firPV¶EHKDYLRUVIROORZLQJHQWU\LQDPXOWLPDUNHW
competitive environment. 
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Dike and Rose (2015) find evidence of oligopolistic reaction among MNOs in SSA, 
considering both indigenous and foreign firms. Thus, we expect to observe imitative FDI behaviors 
among the indigenous SSA MNOs, and hypothesize as follows: 
Hypothesis 4: Indigenous MNOs exhibit oligopolistic reaction, specifically a bandwagon 
effect, as they compete with each other in the SSA region. 
Data and Methods 
We consider the population of international moves by indigenous SSA MNOs, through 
2014. The data used to test our hypotheses come from online secondary sources, including 
company websites and the websites of the national telecom commissions associated with the home 
countries of the five indigenous MNOs: Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of 
Zimbabwe (http://www.potraz.gov.zw) for Econet, Nigerian Communications Commission 
(http://www.ncc.gov.ng/) for GLO, Independent Communications Authority of South Africa 
(https://www.icasa.org.za/ IRU 071 DQG 6PLOH DQG 6XGDQ¶V 1DWLRQDO 7HOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQ
Commission (http://www.ntc.gov.sd/index.php/en/) for Sudatel. Data have also been collected 
from the databases of the Global System for Mobile Association (GSMA)4, the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU)5, and the Global Economy6 and World Bank7 databases, as well 
as from media (newspaper and journal) publications. Consistent with Lincoln and Guba (1985), 
this combination of internal and external data sources aims to offer stronger validity for our study. 
                                                          
4
 The GSMA is an industry association that represents nearly 1,100 companies working in the mobile 
telecommunications ecosystem (https://www.gsma.com). 
5
 The ITU is an agency of the United Nations (http://www.itu.int). 
6
 http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/ 
7
 http://www.worldbank.org 
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We employ a variety of statistical approaches to test our hypotheses: binomial analysis 
(H1); binary logistic regression modelling (H2A-C and H3A-C); and hypergeometric analysis 
(H4), following Rose and Ito (2008). The data employed for the binomial and hypergeometric 
analyses, are shown in Table 1. We use the five 012V¶PDUNHWHQWU\ORFDWLRQVDQGGDWHVWRWHVW
H1. The information regarding the markets in which each of the MNOs operates serves to identify 
instances of co-location; these data represent the input into the hypergeometric analysis used to 
test H4. 
Consistent with past literature, we test H2A-C and H3A-C using logistic regression 
modeling. Our binary dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the indigenous SSA MNO has an 
FDI position in a country, and 0 otherwise. H2A-C all pertain to macro-level host-market 
attributes: economic growth, standard of living, and market size. We operationalize these attributes 
using the annual percentage of growth in GDP, GDP per capita, and population, respectively. 
These time-varying variables are each measured three years SULRU WR WKH ILUP¶V HQWU\ LQWR WKH
specific market, under the assumption that such strategic moves require considerable planning; 
discussions with industry experts made it clear that a three-year lag is reflective of the typical 
decision-making process in this industry in the SSA region. 
H3A-C address institutional attributes: language match and colonial ties between the home 
and host countries, and the control over corruption in the host country. Language match and 
colonial ties are operationalized using dummy variables (1 for yes and 0 for no). Our corruption 
PHDVXUHLVRSHUDWLRQDOL]HGXVLQJWKH:RUOG%DQN¶V&RQWURORI&RUUXSWLRQLQGH[ZKLFKLVRQHRI
the World Governance Indicators. Combined for the World Bank from a wide variety of sources, 
this index rHSUHVHQWV WKH GHJUHH WR ZKLFK FRUUXSWLRQ KDV DQ LPSDFW RI WKH FRXQWU\¶V EXVLQHVV
environment, with higher values presenting lower levels of corruption (see 
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http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc) for more detail regarding the 
development of this measure. 
In our models, we control for the percentage of the host-country population that was living 
LQXUEDQHQYLURQPHQWVWKUHH\HDUVSULRUWRWKHILUP¶VHQWU\RQWKHEDVis that high urban density 
should be preferable for the investing MNOs. We also include control variables for four of the five 
MNOs, leaving MTN as the base category. 
Our dataset is restricted to those 22 countries in which at least one of the five firms of 
LQWHUHVWKDVDSUHVHQFHRPLWWLQJILUPV¶SRVLWLRQVLQWKHLUKRPHFRXQWULHV\LHOGVILUP-country 
observations. In light of two substantial, compensating outliers in one variable8, we undertake our 
analysis with and without those two values. Tables 2-5 show the variable information, descriptive 
statistics, and correlations for the variables used in the modelling. 
-----Insert Tables 2-5 about here----- 
Results 
The SSA region is extremely diverse, culturally and institutionally. In H1, we posit that, 
consistent with the Uppsala model, indigenous SSA MNOs will begin their internationalization 
activities in geographically-close, and therefore more familiar, countries. We assess H1 by 
dividing SSA into four regions (Eastern, Western, Central, Southern), and considering the 
region(s) in which each MNO expanded in its first year of international activity. Using this 
admittedly-coarse measure, H1 receives no support, with only GLO remaining fully in its West 
region (Benin and Ghana) during its first year of internationalization. Using the binomial 
distribution to assess the significance of this one firm out of five, H1 is contradicted with p<0.10 
                                                          
8
 Our measure for economic growth, used to test H2a, is extremely low for Liberia in 2003 and extremely high for 
Rwanda in 1995; MTN entered Liberia in 2006 and Rwanda in 1998. 
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LIZHGHILQH³KLJKHUSURSHQVLW\´DVSUREDELOLW\DQGZLWKp<0.05 and p<0.01 using 65% and 
78%, respectively.9  
The logistic regression results are shown in Table 6, for both the full data set and the 
reduced one (absent the two outliers with respect to economic growth). None of the estimated 
models suffers from multicollinearity, as shown by the low variance inflation factors (VIFs); to 
ensure that multicollinearity is not an issue, we estimate the models to test H3a and H3b separately, 
due to the understandably strong relationship between the language match and colonial ties 
variables. The Hosmer-Lemeshow p-values are all at least 0.05, which implies that each of the 
models fits relatively consistently across the range of the data; this is comparable to the necessary 
property of homoscedasticity in linear regression. The models all offer reasonable classification 
performance. 
-----Insert Table 6 about here----- 
Considering the control variables, each of the four firm-specific indicators adds significant 
explanatory power to the models, indicating a lower probability of investment, relative to MTN10, 
DVH[SHFWHGIURPWKHLQIRUPDWLRQLQ7DEOH7KHKRVWPDUNHW¶VSHUFHQWDJHRIXUEDQSRSXODWLRQ
on the other hand, does not add marginal explanatory power to any of the models. 
The only hypothesis to receive consistent support is H3C, regarding corruption; the 
estimated coefficient is positive and significant (at least p<0.10) in all four of the models (full and 
reduced), suggesting that stronger control over corruption is associated with a higher probability 
that the firm is present in the country, marginal to the other variables in the model. H2C, pertaining 
                                                          
9
 Looking at it from a different angle, only three of the eight initial market entries (37.5%) undertaken by any of 
these firms were within their home regions, providing no support for H1. 
10
 We follow the standard practice of using the largest category as the base, to enhance the stability of the models; 
MTN has operations in the most countries among the five indigenous MNOs. 
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to population size, receives limited support (p<0.10) when the outliers are removed and language 
match is included in the model, providing surprisingly weak evidence that the MNOs are drawn to 
larger markets. Unexpectedly, H2A is contradicted (p<0.10) in the reduced sample, while H2B 
receives no support; in combination, these findings suggest that MNOs in SSA are not particularly 
driven by economic conditions in potential host markets. Institutional factors apart from corruption 
contribute no marginal explanatory power in our models, as none of the estimated coefficients 
associated with either language match (H3A) or colonial ties (H3B) differs significantly from zero. 
Finally, we test H4, regarding oligopolistic reaction, using hypergeometric analysis; see 
Rose and Ito (2008) for a detailed description. Table 7 shows the actual and expected numbers of 
meetings between pairs of indigenous SSA MNOs; the expected numbers are calculated using the 
hypergeometric distribution, under the assumption that the MNOs make their market entry 
decisions independently of each other. We find no support for H4; rather, it is contradicted for 
Econet and MTN, who meet each other in significantly fewer markets than expected (p<0.05), 
suggesting the potential for active avoidance between these Zimbabwean and South African firms. 
-----Insert Table 7 about here----- 
Discussion 
These findings offer some new insights into EMNE internationalization, from the 
perspective of the cross-ERUGHULQYHVWPHQWEHKDYLRUVWKDWIRUPSDUWRILQGLJHQRXVILUPV¶VWUDWHJLHV
within their home region. Contrary to stages models, for instance, these SSA-based MNOs did not 
tend to begin their international expansion with geographically-close markets. (It is also interesting 
to note that three of the indigenous MNOs, which are all from English-speaking countries, 
undertook FDI positions in French-speaking host countries during their initial year of 
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internationalization, in further contradiction to expectations regarding the minimization of psychic 
distance in early investments.) In addition, key country-specific factors, such as market size and 
standard of living, along with indicators of institutional proximity (common language and colonial 
ties between the home and host countries), all of which the literature advocates as important, are 
not found to be strong determinants of investment location choices for these SSA MNOs, marginal 
to the other variables included in the models. Somewhat curiously, we find evidence that the 
indigenous MNOs in our sample exhibit some preference for markets characterized by lower 
economic growth. 
Despite a clearly-revealed preference for host markets characterized by stronger control 
over corruption, the dominant explanatory power of the MNO-identifying control variables 
suggests that market selection is quite firm-specific. The uniformly-significant coefficients 
associated with the company indicator variables make it clear that MTN is adopting an 
internationalization approach that differs markedly from those of each of its four indigenous 
competitors. Also unexpected is our finding that these indigenous MNOs show no evidence of 
follow-the-leader oligopolistic reaction with respect to entering SSA country markets. Rather, our 
analysis provides evidence of mutual avoidance between Econet and MTN, in contrast to the more 
commonly-observed bandwagon effect that characterizes some of the MNOs¶ FRPSHWLWLYH
interactions in the SSA region when considering both indigenous and non-indigenous firms (see 
Dike & Rose, 2015). 
Thus, we find consistent evidence that these indigenous SSA MNOs appear to be 
internationalizing in a manner that differs from that predicted by the literature. Such unexpected 
cross-border investment behavior, which also questions the home-region boundedness of MNO 
LQYHVWPHQWDVSRVLWHGE\WKHOLWHUDWXUHPD\EHGULYHQE\PDQ\LVVXHVLQFOXGLQJWKHILUPV¶OLPLWHG
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resources, relative to their foreign competitors, especially early in their internationalization 
processes. The notion of constrained resources is also consistent with the significant differences 
between the internationalization strategies of MTN, which is substantially larger in terms of 
revenues, relative to the other four indigenous MNOs in our study. 
.HGLD HW DO  QRWH WKDW UHVRXUFH FRQVWUDLQWV PD\ VHUYH WR KHLJKWHQ (01(V¶
dependence on their home governments; it seems plausible that, especially in this highly-regulated 
industry in which many of the players have emerged from state-owned enterprises, government 
influence may factor into investment decision-making processes. In the rapidly-developing and 
highly-competitive SSA mobile telecom industry, informal relationships may also play 
particularly important roles in reducing psychic distance, leading to FDI patterns that differ from 
those predicted by the extant literature.   
With respect to academic research, the unexpected findings of this study, relative to the 
literature, suggest the importance of more in-depth exploration of the foreign market behaviors 
and competitive interactions of EMNEs, especially those from the strictly-regulated mobile 
telecom industry in the complex and dynamic African continent. It would be incorrect to simply 
assume that these firms are necessarily similar to their developed-market counterparts, in terms of 
the strategies that drive international investment and competition. As the indigenous SSA MNOs 
are operating in the context of two levels of dynamic complexity ± both regional economy and 
industry ± exploring their cross-border expansion patterns and competitive behaviors provides 
insights that can add to the broader EMNE internationalization literature.  
In the context of practice, our study provides insights that are worthy of consideration by 
managers and strategists of emerging-market firms, especially MNOs, which either seek 
international expansion or face competition from rivals. We find clear evidence that cross-border 
  
Cross-border Expansion and Competition of Indigenous SSA MNOs 
 
26 
 
expansion is not confined to geographically-close, obviously-familiar markets, and that market 
size and spending power may not be the most important attributes to consider when selecting new 
locations for FDI within the SSA region. Firms also appear to value better control over corruption, 
relative to stronger macro-economic indicators or the presence of colonial ties or a common 
language between home and host markets. Government officials should, therefore, note the 
strategic importance of tackling corruption in order to make their countries more attractive for 
inward FDI, even by firms from emerging-market home environments.  
Conclusion 
The growing influence of EMNEs, especially as major contributors to global FDI, has 
placed them at the forefront, in terms of firms whose international activities are receiving academic 
attention. Using secondary data derived from a variety of sources, we have investigated the cross-
border investment location choices and competitive interactions of the five indigenous SSA MNOs 
that had undertaken FDI in multiple countries as of 2014. We find that these EMNE MNOs have 
adopted internationalization strategies that are quite distinct to those predicted by the existing 
theoretical perspectives, in terms of both their investment location choices and the manner in which 
they compete with each other across multiple markets.  
Our analysis is, of course, subject to limitations. While our focus on how the indigenous 
SSA MNOs compete with each other reveals an important part of the competitive landscape, it 
does not give the full picture, as foreign firms also play important roles in this industry. The small 
number of indigenous MNOs also yields a small sample size that challenges the power of our 
statistical testing and our ability to employ more complex models. In addition, we are observing 
strategic outcomes, as opposed to the details of strategic processes; not surprisingly, given the 
competitive nature of the industry, the MNO managers have been reluctant to participate in 
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interviews. That said, the fact that we identify unexpected results, given the small number of 
observations, provides confidence that these firms truly are internationalizing using a different set 
of decision criteria. 
Do we need new theory that is specific to Sub-Saharan Africa? We would argue against 
that path, on the basis that current theoretical perspectives lack strong predictive power even in the 
North American and European contexts in which they were developed. However, our findings 
suggest that the existing theoretical perspectives on internationalization and multimarket strategy 
would benefit from more nuance that accounts for the dynamic complexity of both the institutional 
and industrial environments in which EMNEs are operating. Given that the indigenous SSA MNOs 
in our study have tendency to behave in a manner unpredicted by ± and even contrary to ± the 
literature, it will be valuable for future studies to focus on identifying the forces that are actually 
GULYLQJWKHVHILUPV¶LQWHUQDWLRQDOL]DWLRQ$VRXUVWXG\ZDVquantitative, and based on a population 
that included a small number of firms, we recommend that future research would benefit from the 
use of qualitative approaches for more in-depth investigation of the investment behaviors of these 
indigenous SSA firms. The combination of quantitative and approaches will contribute to 
developing a more holistic understanding of the cross-border investment and competitive 
behaviors of these ± and other ± EMNEs. 
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Table 1. Market Entries of Individual SSA MNOs 
Country SSA 
Region 
Official 
Language(s) 
Econet 
(Zimbabwe) 
GLO 
(Nigeria) 
MTNa 
(South 
Africa) 
Smile 
(South 
Africa) 
Sudatel 
(Sudan) 
Afghanistan n/a Dari, Pashto   2006   
Benin West French  2008 2006   
Botswana South English 2004  2005   
Burundi Central French 2009     
Cameroon Central French   2000   
CAR Central French 2014     
Congo Central French   2005   
&RWHG¶,YRLUH West French  2009 2005   
Cyprus n/a Greek, 
Turkish 
  2004   
Ghana West English  2008 2006  2008 
Guinea West French   2006  2012 
Guinea Bissau West Portuguese   2006   
Iran n/a Persian   2005   
Kenya East English 2004     
Lesotho South English 2008     
Liberia West English   2006   
Mauritania West French     2007 
Nigeria West English 2001 2003 2001 2013  
Rwanda Central Englishb  
 
1998 
 
 
Senegal West French     2009 
South Africa South English   1994   
South Sudan East English   2011  1993c 
Sudan East English   2005  1993 
Swaziland South English   1998   
Syria n/a Arabic   2007   
Tanzania East English    2012  
Uganda East English   1998 2009  
Yemen n/a Arabic   2001   
Zambia South English   2005   
Zimbabwe South English 1998     
a
 MTN is the only indigenous Sub-Saharan Africa mobile operator that has internationalized beyond Africa, with 
operations in Afghanistan, Cyprus, Iran, Syria, and Yemen. 
b English became the official language of Rwanda in 2009; previously, French had been the official language. 
c
 6RXWK6XGDQZDVHVWDEOLVKHGLQVR6XGDWHO¶VLQYHVWPHQWGLGQRWFRQVWLWXWHLQWHUQDWLRQDODFWLYLW\ 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and variable descriptions ± full sample (n=107) 
Variable Notes Mean Median Std 
dev 
Min Max 
Present? 1=yes, 0=noa 0.30 0 0.46 0 1 
Economic growth 
of host country 
(GDP) 
Annual percentage growth in 
GDP, measured three years prior 
WRILUP¶VHQWU\LQWRWKHVSHFLILF
countryb 
4.44 4.56 5.36 -30.15 35.22 
GDP per capita (ln 
USD value + 10) 
U.S. dollars, measured three 
\HDUVSULRUWRILUP¶VHQWU\LQWR
the specific countryb 
7.73 7.76 0.72 6.36 9.55 
Population (ln 
Million) 
Millions of people, measured 
WKUHH\HDUVSULRUWRILUP¶VHQWU\
into the specific countryb 
2.29 2.38 1.22 -0.04 5.13 
Language match 
between homes and 
host countries? 
1=yes, 0=no 0.39 0 0.49 0 1 
Colonial ties 
between homes and 
host countries? 
1=yes, 0=no 0.27 0 0.45 0 1 
Control of 
corruption  
Index representing perceptions 
of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private 
gain; -2.5 represents weak 
control and +2.5 represents 
strong controlc 
-0.70 -0.86 0.56 -1.51 0.92 
Urban population 
(%) 
Measured three years prior to 
ILUP¶VHQWU\LQWRWKHVSHFLILF
countryb 
37.73 39.28 14.28 9.62 64.10 
Econet Firm dummy; 1=Econet, 
0=other 
0.20 0 0.40 0 1 
GLO Firm dummy; 1=GLO, 0=other 0.20 0 0.40 0 1 
Smile Firm dummy; 1=Smile, 0=other 0.20 0 0.40 0 1 
Sudatel Firm dummy; 1=Sudatel, 
0=other 
0.20 0 0.40 0 1 
a
 Source: company and national telecom commissions websites 
b
 Source: http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/ and http://www.worldbank.org/ 
c
 Source: http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/ 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics ± reduced sample (n=105) 
Variable Mean Median Std dev Min Max 
Present? 0.29 0 0.45 0 1 
Economic growth of host 
country (GDP) 
4.47 4.56 3.03 -5.47 11.53 
GDP per capita (ln USD 
value + 10) 
7.75 7.78 0.70 6.54 9.55 
Population (ln Million) 2.31 2.38 1.22 -0.04 5.13 
Language match between 
homes and host countries? 
0.39 0 0.49 0 1 
Colonial ties between homes 
and host countries? 
0.28 0 0.45 0 1 
Control of corruption  -0.69 -0.86 0.57 -1.51 0.92 
Urban population (%) 37.92 39.28 14.14 9.62 64.10 
Econet 0.20 0 0.40 0 1 
GLO 0.20 0 0.40 0 1 
Smile 0.20 0 0.40 0 1 
Sudatel 0.20 0 0.40 0 1 
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Table 4. Correlation matrix ± full sample (n=107) 
 

 p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, two-tailed tests 
 
  
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1. Present? 1.00           
2. Economic growth -0.04 1.00          
3. GDP per capita (ln) -0.12 0.00 1.00         
4. Population (ln) 0.03 0.13 -0.09 1.00        
5. Language match 0.02 -0.05 0.13 0.11 1.00       
6. Colonial ties 0.15 0.00 0.29** 0.18 0.76** 1.00      
7. Control of corruption 0.07 0.22* 0.40** -0.37** 0.12 0.18 1.00     
8. Urban population (%) -0.13 -0.12 0.41** -0.19* -0.12 -0.24* 0.08 1.00    
9. Econet -0.03 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.20* 0.02 0.02 1.00   
10. GLO -0.12 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.20* -0.07 -0.00 -0.25** 1.00  
11. Smile -0.17 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.02 -0.31** 0.03 0.04 -0.25** -0.25** 1.00 
12. Sudatel -0.12 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.40** -0.31** 0.04 0.02 -0.25** -0.25** -0.25** 
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Table 5. Correlation matrix ± reduced sample (n=105) 
 

 p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, two-tailed tests 
 
  
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1. Present? 1.00           
2. Economic growth -0.06 1.00          
3. GDP per capita (ln) -0.07 0.04 1.00         
4. Population (ln) 0.05 0.17 -0.12 1.00        
5. Language match 0.01 0.11 0.14 0.12 1.00       
6. Colonial ties 0.18 0.00 0.28** 0.17 0.78** 1.00      
7. Control of corruption 0.10 0.34** 0.39** -0.38** 0.12 0.17 1.00     
8. Urban population (%) -0.11 0.02 0.41** -0.20* -0.14 -0.25* 0.08 1.00    
9. Econet -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.16 0.20* 0.01 0.01 1.00   
10. GLO -0.10 -0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.12 0.20* -0.08 -0.01 -0.26** 1.00  
11. Smile -0.16 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.31** 0.02 0.03 -0.26** -0.26** 1.00 
12. Sudatel -0.10 -0.04 -0.00 0.00 -0.40** -0.31** 0.04 0.02 -0.26** -0.26** -0.26** 
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Table 6. Logistic regression results 
 
 
Variables 
Full sample (n=107) Reduced sample (n=105) 
Controls Testing H3a Testing H3b Controls Testing H3a Testing H3b 
Constant -1.72 (0.67)* 5.73 (3.39) 6.22 (3.61) 1.23 (0.78) 7.06 (3.93) 7.99 (4.11) 
H2A: Economic growth  -0.06 (0.05) -0.05 (0.05)  -0.20 (0.11) -0.20 (0.11) 
H2B: GDP per capita (ln)  -0.47 (0.45) -0.62 (0.50)  -0.61 (0.51) -0.82 (0.55) 
H2C: Population (ln)  0.32 (0.25) 0.24 (0.25)  0.48 (0.27) 0.42 (0.27) 
H3A: Language match  -0.70 (0.63)   -0.64 (0.66)  
H3B: Colonial ties   0.12 (0.77)   0.21 (0.78) 
H3C: Control of corruption  1.19 (0.56)* 1.03 (0.55)   1.65 (0.65)* 1.54 (0.65)* 
Urban population (%) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02) 
Econet -1.72 (0.67)* -1.82 (0.69)** -1.85 (0.70)** -1.59 (0.67)* -1.79 (0.72)** -1.82 (0.72)** 
GLO -2.20 (0.74)** -2.26 (0.75)** -2.23 (0.74)** -2.07 (0.73)** -2.19 (0.77)** -2.16 (0.76)** 
Smile -2.53 (0.78)** -2.87 (0.86)** -2.26 (0.84)** -2.40 (0.78)** -2.75 (0.88)** -2.45 (0.92)** 
Sudatel -2.18 (0.71)** -2.70 (0.84)** -2.18 (0.71)** -2.05 (0.73)** -2.62 (0.87)** -2.16 (0.87)* 
Pseudo R2 (Nagelkerke) 0.24 0.31 0.29 0.21 0.30 0.29 
Correct classification (%) 77.6 73.8 74.8 77.1 73.3 74.3 
Hosmer-Lemeshow p-value 0.12 0.57 0.18 0.06 0.05 0.22 
Maximum VIF 1.59 1.82 2.14 1.66 1.96 2.13 

 p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, two-tailed tests 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 7. Hypergeometric analysis of SSA meetings (expected numbers of meetings, assuming 
independent market selection, in italics) 
 Total foreign 
countries 
Econet 
(Zimbabwe) 
GLO 
(Nigeria) 
MTN 
(South Africa) 
Smile 
(South Africa) 
Econet 7     
Glo 4 0 
1.1 
   
MTN 17 2 
4.8* 
4 
2.7 
  
Smile 3 0 
0.8 
1 
0.5 
2 
2.0 
 
Sudatel 6 0 
1.7 
1 
1.0 
4 
4.1 
0 
0.7 
* p < 0.05, two-tailed tests  
 
For example, MTN operates in 17 SSA countries and Econet in seven. They compete head-to-head 
in two markets. Assuming that the two companies make their market entry decisions 
independently, the number of markets in which they would be expected to meet is 4.8, based on 
the hypergeometric distribution. Under the assumption of independence, the probability that they 
would meet in six or more markets is 0.02. Thus, they meet significantly less frequently than would 
be expected if their strategies were independent.  
 
